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BANK LOAN AGREEMENT AND CEO COMPENSATION 
Amine Khayati, Southern Polytechnic State University, GA 
Donald L. Ariail, Southern PolytechnicState University, GA 
ABSTRACT 
Contrary to other forms of outside financing, the announcement of a bank loan agreement 
prompts a positive and significant market return. Throughout the literature, bank loans are 
deemed special and unique due to multiple benefits accruing to bank borrowers. The short-term 
positive market reaction is however inconsistent with the long-term underperformance of 
borrowing firms (Billet et al., 2006). We find that unlike shareholders, CEOs gain from the bank 
loan relation over the long-term. Specifically, we find that bank loan agreement elicits a 
significant increase in total compensation through an increase in non-performance based 
compensation components such as salary, bonus and other compensation. We also report a 
smaller proportion of performance based compensation following the bank agreement. 
Generally, the results suggest that subsequent to a major bank loan, CEOs seem to gain enough 
influence to shield their compensation from the firm’s underperformance. In particular, this 
evidence supports the “uniqueness” of bank loan relations. 
 
Keywords: Bank loan, CEO compensation, corporate governance. 
INTRODUCTION 
An extensive body of literature establishes the commercial banks’ certification role 
pertaining to information advantage, special monitory abilities, and securities underwriting (e.g. 
Leland & Pyle, 1977; Diamond, 1984, 1991; Fama, 1985). Specifically, these studies argue that 
commercial banks possess the technical skills and capacities to monitor their corporate clients 
over extended periods of time and ensure more reliable disclosure. The capital market regards 
banks as firm insiders and therefore reacts positively to the announcement of a bank loan relation 
(e.g. James, 1987; Mikkelson & Partch, 1986; Billett, Flannery & Garfinkel, 1995). One may 
expect that this certification role affects corporate control mechanisms as well. In due course, 
commercial bank monitoring should be able to help mitigate corporate agency costs seeing that 
lending banks generally restrict managers from engaging in risky behavior and require more 
transparency and disclosure (Preece & Mullineaux, 1984). 
  An additional consequence of increased monitoring can equally be a valuable argument 
for a manager to negotiate higher compensation. In fact, when a CEO believes that there are no 
major risky investments to undertake in the near future, he would turn to a bank loan to finance 
the relatively safe investments (see Holthausen & Leftwich, 1986; Hand, Holthausen, & Leftwich, 
1992). Bank loans provide less expensive capital and bank monitoring prevents the firm from 
engaging in risky investments, which is in line with the CEOs short-term strategy. Knowing 
that the firm is undertaking safer investments, the CEO does not expect to have outstanding return 
on investment and therefore higher compensation in the near future. Consequently, one would 
expect the CEO to aggressively demand higher compensation following the grant of a major bank 
loan and use this event to secure an above average increase in compensation. The increased 
monitoring from highly reputable banks is proved to send a positive signal to the capital markets. 
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The CEO may typically advocate the positive stock market reaction following the announcement 
of the loan agreement along with the increased transparency and scrutiny provided by the bank 
relation. While major bank loans may benefit shareholders by improving profitability and 
providing leverage, it has uncertain economic merit and may increase the firms’ total risk. A 
recent study by Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) examines the post-announcement 
performance of bank borrowers and finds that firms announcing bank loans suffer significant 
negative abnormal returns over the subsequent three years. This fact seems to contradict the 
market expectations from a bank loan agreement. CEO compensation is then affected by two 
opposing forces: the first is the favorable market reaction attributable to the bank relation and the 
second is the documented future underperformance. It is therefore interesting to study the 
behavior of CEO compensation following bank loan agreement. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the behavior of CEO compensation following the 
grant of a major bank loan. Using an extensive sample of 743 bank loan agreements from 1992 
to 2007, we find that, despite the lower long-term returns for shareholders, CEOs benefit from 
the bank relation through an increase in total compensation and a reduction in pay-at-risk 
compensation components. Particularly, we conclude that borrowing CEOs gain a greater 
bargaining power that allows them to negotiate a higher compensation scheme unrelated to firm 
performance. Overall, the results have several implications on optimal compensation policy, 
CEOs incentive alignment, and corporate governance theory. 
We make two major contributions to the literature. First, we document a substantial 
increase in CEO compensation following private loan agreement despite the firms’ long-term 
underperformance. Second, our study analyzes the relation between managerial incentives and 
corporate financing decision. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Theories of financial intermediation emphasize the informational advantage of banks. 
Leland and Pyle (1977) and Diamond (1984) develop models in which banks are shown to have 
an information advantage and special monitoring ability over public lenders. There are several 
theories explaining the source of this information advantage. Some assert that banks can access 
additional information about their borrowers since they provide other intermediary and 
transaction services. However, the most common argument is the ability of banks to build long- 
term lending and personal relationships with their borrowers. The uniqueness of bank loans has 
since been extensively addressed in the literature. For instance, Fama (1985) concludes that there 
must be something special about bank loans in view of his findings that the reserve tax 
requirement is borne by banks’ borrowers and depositors. 
Diamond (1991) argues that firms tend to reduce adverse selection and build a reputation 
by taking monitored bank loans. After achieving a favorable track record, firms then turn to 
utilizing publicly traded debt. Accordingly, bank monitoring is an effective way for firms to 
eliminate the moral hazard problem and to obtain access to cheaper public financing. From a 
bank’s perspective, yet using the same logic, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) demonstrate that 
banks treatment of borrowing firms in financial distress is different from that of bondholders. In 
fact, banks tend to build a reputation for financial flexibility by promising borrowers that they 
will credibly devote more resources to evaluate renegotiation alternatives and hence avoid 
inefficient liquidation. Consequently, managers holding private information about the future 
prospects of the firm choose bank loans over bond financing. In both Diamond (1991) and 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), firms seem to benefits from bank loans through access to 
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public debts and the flexibility of bank loan re-negotiability. Among other things, these studies 
suggest that banks are better suited than public creditors to reduce information asymmetries and 
screen and monitor the future prospects of their borrowers. Thus, the announcement of a bank 
loan agreement should evidently convey positive information. 
Several studies have documented the stock market response to bank loans. Mikkelson and 
Partch (1986) are the first to report a positive market reaction to the announcement of new bank 
credit agreements. This study provides a limited analysis of bank loans since it primarily focuses 
on the negative market reaction to the announcement of common stock and convertible debt 
offerings. James (1987) extends the bank loan analysis and finds a similar positive market 
response. Further, he finds that the announcement of private placements and straight debt issues 
has an adverse market reaction, especially for issues used to repay bank loans. Another study by 
Lummer and McConnell (1989) distinguishes between new bank loans and renewals. While they 
find no significant excess returns following the announcement of new credit agreements, they 
report significantly positive announcement returns for favourable loan revisions, and significantly 
negative returns for unfavourable revised credit agreements. Accordingly, lending banks have no 
informational advantage at the initiation of a loan agreement. Nonetheless, banks achieve an 
information advantage as they develop a continuous credit relationship. 
An extensive body of empirical studies also investigates the market response to other 
forms of external financing: seasoned equity offerings, initial public offerings, straight public 
debt, convertible debt, convertible preferred stock and private placements. These studies have 
systematically reported a negative stock price reaction to many of the above forms of financing 
(See Smith (1986) for a review of this literature). 
A part from the positive market response to the announcement of bank loans, several 
studies also establish the uniqueness of bank loans. Dahiya, Puri and Saunders (2003) provide 
evidence of negative market reaction for a borrowing firm following the announcement of its 
loan sale in the secondary market by the lending bank. This negative certification effect is 
subsequently confirmed after the loan sale by the firm’s poor performance and the increased 
proportion of borrowers filing for bankruptcy. Hence, the information content of credit 
relationship termination through a loan sale seems to carry the opposite effect of a loan initiation 
and provide further support to the special role of banks. Within the same context, the recent 
dramatic expansion in the secondary market for bank loans may serve as an alternative source of 
information and therefore reduces a bank’s incentive to monitor. Gande and Saunders (2006) 
provide evidence to the contrary. They find that the initiation of bank loans trading in the 
secondary market triggers a positive market reaction for the borrowing firm. Most importantly, 
they find that the presence of the secondary market does not adversely affect distressed 
borrowers, known to benefit the most from a bank relationship. The study concludes that banks 
continue to be special despite the presence of a well-developed secondary market for bank loans. 
As such, banks and a secondary market for bank loans are complementary sources of information 
and monitoring. 
Preece and Mullineaux (1994) extend the literature on the certification role to non-bank 
firms. They argue that non-bank firms are able to enter the commercial lending market largely 
due to technological advances and acquire some of the bank information advantages. 
Consequently, they find that the announcement of credit agreements with non-bank firms elicits 
positive stock returns for borrowing firms. 
One strand of the literature focuses on the contractual characteristics of bank loans to 
explain the potential sources of gain to borrowers. For instance, the work of Preece and 
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Mullineaux (1996) suggests that, in addition to the benefits of monitoring, contractual flexibility 
offered by private debt contracts could be a source of value to borrowing firms. They use the 
number of lenders as a proxy for contractual flexibility and ability to restructure the loan in the 
event of financial distress. The evidence suggests that the market reaction to a loan 
announcement is a decreasing function of the number of lending banks in a syndicate. Therefore, 
the increased capacity to renegotiate a loan among fewer lenders constitutes another source of 
value to borrowing firms. In addition, Billett, mark and Flannery (1995) find that the market 
reaction to a bank loan is also a function of the identity of the lending institution. Specifically, 
the market reacts more favorably to borrowers contracting with high credit rating lenders. They 
also find no difference between the market’s reaction to loans issued by bank and non-bank 
institutions. However, as explained in Carey, Post and Sharpe (1998), non-bank institutions 
differ in their lending practices since they serve riskier and more leveraged borrowers. Similarly, 
Berger and Udell (1995) point out that some of the benefits inherent in a banking relationship are 
stronger for small borrowing firms, where asymmetric information is a more acute problem. 
Consistent with banks’ information role, small borrowing firms with  longer banking relationships 
enjoy lower interest rates and need to provide less collateral on their loans. 
Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1993) provide further support to the uniqueness of bank 
relationship. Their study reports a significant correlation between a client firm value and the 
future prospects of the corresponding lending bank. Using a unique database of failed banks, the 
study documents that an increase in the probability of bank dissolution reduces the market values 
of its client firms, and the subsequent FDIC bank rescue enhances client firm value. This implies 
that borrowing firms are stakeholders in the banks from which they borrow. Reciprocally, 
Dahiya, Saunders and Srinivasan (2003) examine the effect of financially distressed borrowers 
on lending banks and find that the announcement of a major corporate borrower default or 
bankruptcy significantly reduces the lead lending bank value. This negative effect is even larger 
for banks having past lending relationships with the distressed borrowers. 
From another perspective, recent technological progress has spurred a debate about whether 
banks can maintain their information advantages with the advent of low-cost and publicly 
available information sources (For example, Peterson & Rajan, 2002; Boyd & Gertler, 1994). 
These studies report substantial developments in the financial sector and a potential demise 
of the benefits drawn from bank lending relationships. This hypothesis is supported by the 
recent decline in the market valuation effect of bank loans as stated in Fields, Fraser, Berry and 
Byers (2006). Accordingly, they report a decline in abnormal returns following the announcement 
of a bank loan agreement. They also find that in recent years, bank loan abnormal returns have 
disappeared. This recent development in the market reaction to bank loan agreements is 
consistent with the notion that informational technology advances and the shift toward a 
market-based financial system have eroded the value of bank credit relationships (James & 
Smith, 2000). 
Despite the extensive theoretical evidence of bank certification effect discussed above, 
recent work of Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) on the long-term performance of bank 
loan borrowers raises serious questions about the reliance on market short-run valuation effects. 
They particularly provide evidence of bank borrowers’ underperformance during the three years 
following the loan agreement. In addition, the analysis of the market reaction around the quarterly 
earnings announcement reveals significantly negative abnormal returns. This is also supported by 
the relatively worse operating performance of bank borrowers in the post-loan period and even in 
the year preceding the loan agreement. Such evidence contradicts the significantly positive 
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abnormal return surrounding the announcement of the bank loan. According to the former 
study, there is no difference between bank loans and equity or public debt offerings since both are 
followed by significantly worse stock performance. In contradiction with the early literature 
(Slovin, Sushka & Polonchek, 1993; Dahiya, Saunders & Srinivasan, 2003), they report a 
negative relation between lender protection and borrower performance, suggesting that lenders 
effectively protect themselves from poor performance. 
This long-run negative performance of bank borrowers motivates our study. Specifically, 
we examine the relation between managerial compensation and corporate financing decisions. 
This relation has been addressed by very few recent papers. For example, Harford and Li (2007) 
find that “following a merger, a CEO’s pay and overall wealth become insensitive to negative 
stock performance, but a CEO wealth rises in step with positive stock performance”. Another 
study by Jiang and Zhang (2008) reports the CEOs use of adjustments (Board compensation 
grant and portfolio adjustments) to offset the negative valuation effect of Seasoned Equity 
Offerings (SEOs). To our knowledge, we are the first paper to address the change in CEO 
compensation from the perceptive of bank loan financing. We fill in the gap in the literature and 
provide several contributions. 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The positive valuation effect of bank loans is widely established in the literature. 
However, private knowledge of poor future performance may induce CEOs to take actions to 
protect their wealth. First, they may sell some of their holdings to cash in on the abnormal stock 
price run up following the bank loan announcement. Second, they can affect the timing of 
compensation grants, so that they are awarded before the bank loan announcement. 
From another perspective, contracting a major new loan increases the firm size and may 
change the scope of its operations. The loan financing decision hence provides an opportunity for 
the CEO to renegotiate his/her compensation. By securing a bank loan, the CEO sends a positive 
signal to the market, reduces information asymmetry, and facilitates future public financing 
(Diamond 1991). These facts are compelling arguments while negotiating a higher pay. In 
addition, the CEO’s private knowledge of the firm’s murky future performance (Billett et al. 
2006) may lead to argue for less sensitivity to performance for the first few years. The CEO may 
also justify this downside protection arguing the restrictions on risk taking behavior and other 
covenants imposed by the loan agreement. This conjecture is however in contradiction with 
Almazan and Suarez (2003) who theoretically model for the borrowing firm’s compensation. 
Their model predicts that firms with the proper compensation scheme will induce managers with 
the highest unobservable profitability prospects to be more inclined to submit to bank monitoring. 
Bank financing is then a signal of higher profitability. This is in turn consistent with the event 
study analysis of Dahiya, Saunders and Srinivasan (2003). Bank monitoring also reduces the 
manager’s private benefits and hence complements the use of incentive compensation. A key 
prediction of this model is that borrowing firms tend to offer compensation contracts with higher 
pay for performance sensitivity to induce managers to accept bank scrutiny. Managers should be 
generously rewarded in cases of subsequent high-performance, except for those with low-
profitability firms within the separating regime. If the bank loan is associated with managerial 
accountability and high profitability prospects, we should expect CEO compensation to become 
more sensitive to firm performance. In the event of negative abnormal returns during the post-
announcement period, it is intrinsic to hypothesize that the post loan announcement CEO 
compensation should be negatively affected. 
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Based on the mentioned literature and the above discussion, the following null hypotheses 
can be tested: 
 
H1 The  announcement  of  a  bank  loan  should  have  a  long-run  negative  effect  on  CEO 
compensation components. 
H2 Borrowing firm CEOs should have high-performance based compensation following a bank loan. 
Data 
Identifying Bank Loans 
Our sample consists of loan agreements involving U.S. borrowers collected from Loan 
Pricing Dealscan (Table “Package”) data. The executive compensation data is from Standard 
and Poor’s ExecuComp, and the firm-level financial data is from Compustat. We first merge the 
ExecuComp list of companies (for active and inactive companies) with the Loan Pricing 
Corporation Dealscan (Table “Package”) data. Due to the lack of common company identifiers 
between the two databases, we simultaneously match by company name, zip code and SIC code. 
This procedure yields a total of 2,165 matched firms. 
Next, we delete utilities (4900-4999 SIC codes) and financial service (SIC code 6000-
6999) firms resulting in a loss of 145 and 176 observations respectively. After merging with 
Compustat database, we lose an additional 10 observations. Therefore, we end up with a final 
listof 1,834 observations. 
Subsequently, we identify all bank loan agreements in Dealscan for each firm in our 
sample of 1,834 observations. We are technically limited to focusing on the period from 1993 to 
2007 because Execucomp data is available beginning in 1992. Retrieving all the bank loan 
agreements relating to our sample’s firms over this time period yields a total of 12,350 
observations. Next, we delete 228 observations due to duplication and an additional 1,190 
observations due to missing market capitalization data in Compustat. Among the remaining 
10,932 observations, we select firms that do not have loan agreements in the preceding and 
following year. There are 3,894 observations that satisfy this condition. We subsequently delete 
1,389 observations due to duplications in Dealscan. These duplications are due to multiple 
observations which reflect consequent amendments related to the same loan agreement. Among 
the 2,505 observations remaining, there are 613 cases where the firm had more than one bank 
loan during the year under consideration. These cases are rather relevant to our study and thus 
we compute the total value of these multiple loans, and add them to the analysis. 
To increase the likelihood of capturing the effect of bank loan agreements on 
compensation and to minimize the influence of outliers, we further require that the loan value 
represent at least 10% of the borrowing firm market capitalization in the year preceding the bank 
loan agreement. We believe that this restriction is essential in our analysis. The data sources in 
earlier studies were primarily news media. For instance, Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995) 
use the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service and Best and Zhang (1993) use the Wall Street 
Journal for bank loan announcements. These studies have no restriction on loan size as anyone 
would expect the mainstream media to be mostly interested in major and newsworthy loan 
agreements. Whereas, LPC Dealscan systematically compiles loans filed with the Security and 
Exchange Commission and from other reliable public sources. By applying the 10% restriction, 
we further delete 695 observations. 
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Using the sample of firms with bank loan(s) higher than 10% of the company’s market 
capitalization (sample size 1,810), we identify 941 ExecuComp firms for which the same CEO is 
in office during the year before the loan, the year of the loan and the year after. 
Control Sample 
We next match each of the 941 observations with a control firm. The same requirements 
of data availability in ExecuComp and the same CEO over the three years period also apply to 
the control sample. The matching procedure is as follows: 
We first match firms by total assets within 80% and 120% of the borrowing firm and with 
the same four digits SIC codes. These restrictions resulted in 230 matching firms. 
Then, we relax the matching criteria to total assets within 80% and 120% of the firm and 
with the same three digits SIC codes, resulting in an additional 124 matching firms. 
Then, we relax the matching procedure to two digits SIC codes, and obtain 259 additional 
matching firms. 
For the remaining observations, we relax the matching criteria to two digits SIC codes 
with total sales between 80% and 120% of the original firm. These constraints added another 130 
matching firms. 
Overall, we manage to match 743 of the 941 firms with a control firm. Therefore, our 
final sample contains 743 borrowing firms each with a corresponding matching firm. We also 
classify the borrowing firms by year and systematically check that none of the borrowing firms 
in that specific year is used as a matching firm. 
Data distribution and Characteristics 
Table 1 reports the distribution of bank loans by industry and year. We categorize the 
sample firms based on the 48 Fama and French (1997) industry classifications, among which 42 
industries are represented in our sample. The distribution of firms among the various industries 
seems  uniform  except  for  a  relatively  high  concentration  for  industries  such  as  Business 
Services, Retail, Machinery and Wholesale. Similarly, the firms’ distribution across time is 
uniform. On average, there are fifty bank loan agreements satisfying our selection criteria every 
year. In general, Table 1 indicates that our sample firms are evenly distributed across industry 
and time dimensions. We therefore feel confident that our bank loan sample does not suffer from 
clustering. 
In panel A of Table 2, we report some of the bank loans’ characteristics. The average 
bank loan amount in our sample is around 350 million (USD) and a median value of 205 million 
(USD). These figures are relatively larger than the reported 116.9 and 45 respectively for mean 
and median in Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995). Likewise, the borrowing firms in our 
sample are relatively larger with regard to both total assets and sales, and a lower beta by 
comparison with the above mentioned study. 
The predominance of larger loan amounts and larger firms in our sample can be best 
explained by the restriction on the firm data availability in ExecuComp database, which covers 
fairly larger firms. A less compelling reason could be attributed to the sample period in Billett, 
Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) covering the period from 1980 to 1989; while our sample starts in 
1993, and both samples are not inflation adjusted. From the other side, the lack of adjustment for 
inflation has no bearing on our results since our analysis compares the sub-sample of borrowing 
firms to that of matching firms and both are affected equally by inflation. 
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Compensation Variables 
Compensation variables are constructed from ExcuComp. The variables’ definitions are 
taken from ExecuComp Data Definitions table. The Salary variable represents the dollar value of 
the base salary earned by the CEO. The Bonus variable is the dollar value of the bonus paid to 
the CEO. The Restricted Stocks variable is the sum of the restricted stock and the stock awarded 
under plan-based awards. Similarly, the Stock Options variable is the sum of the aggregate value 
of stock options granted to the executive during the year and the fair value of all options awarded 
during the year as detailed in the Plan Based Awards. The Other Compensation variable sums up 
all other compensation received by the executive including perquisites and other personal 
benefits, termination or change-in-control payments, contributions to defined contribution plans 
(e.g. 401K plans), life insurance premiums, gross-ups and other tax reimbursements, discounted 
share purchases, the change in pension value and nonqualified deferred compensation earnings, 




DISTRIBUTION OF BANK LOANS BY INDUSTRY AND BY YEAR 
Panel A: Distribution of bank loans by Fama and French Industry 
 
Industry Number of firms 
 
Industry Number of firms 
Agriculture 2 Miscellaneous 3 
Food Products 15 Automobiles and Trucks 17 
Candy and Soda 4 Aircraft 8 
Alcoholic Beverages 1 Shipbuilding, Railroad Eq. 5 
Recreational Products 2 Defense 2 
Entertainment 5 Precious Metals 1 
Printing and Publishing 15 Nonmetallic Mining 2 
Consumer Goods 22 Coal 1 
Apparel 21 Petroleum and Natural Gas 30 
Healthcare 18 Telecommunications 11 
Medical Equipment 27 Personal Services 4 
Pharmaceutical Products 10 Business Services 71 
Chemicals 27 Computers 17 
Rubber and Plastic Products 3 Electronic Equipment 28 
Textiles 8 Measuring and Control Equip 27 
Construction Materials 26 Business Supplies 24 
Construction 21 Shipping Containers 4 
Steel Works, Etc. 38 Transportation 19 
Fabricated Products 5 Wholesale 45 
Machinery 56 Retail 63 
Electrical Equipment 13 Restaurants, Hotel, Motel 22 
Panel B: Distribution of bank loans by year. 
Year Bank Loans Year Bank Loans Year Bank Loans 
1993 11 1998 52 2003 58 
1994 30 1999 47 2004 63 
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1995 47 2000 42 2005 66 
1996 57 2001 56 2006 69 
1997 71 2002 62 2007 12 
 
The data sample includes 743 bank loan observations. The data reported in Panel A represents the distribution of bank loans by 
industry using the 48 Fama and French (1997) industry dummies. The analysis excludes firms in utilities and financial services 
sectors. Panel B reports the distribution of bank loans by year. 
 
Table 2 
SAMPLE SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Panel A: Bank loans’ characteristics 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Deal Amount ($ millions) 354.8 205 10 7000 
Spread (%) (obs. = 570) 2.03 2 1 5 
Panel B: Borrowers’ characteristics 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Borrowers’ Total assets ($ millions) 1877.1 919.8 35.58 28472.4 
Sales ($ millions) 1030.5 918.1 35.58 28472 
Beta 1.09 0.81 -0.23 9.9 
P/E 34.06 18.25 2.13(*) 2835 
ROA (%) 4.26 4.82 -56.36 25.01 
 
This Table presents the bank loans’ characteristics for loan granted to U.S. firm from 1993 to 2007 and retrieved from LPC 
Dealscan database. The sample contains 743 bank loans that represents at least 10% of the borrowing firm market capitalization 
at the year of the loan and conform to other restrictions pertaining to CEO tenure surrounding the year of the loan agreement . The 
Deal Amount is the total value of the loan grant. The spread represents the percentage spread over default base and it is reported 
for only 570 observations. The borrowers’ total assets, sales, beta, price per earning (P/E), and return on assets (ROA) are all 
measured at the beginning of the year of the bank loan agreement. 
(*) Due to missing values in Compustat, the P/E ratio minimum value is positive despite a negative minimum value for the RO 
ratio. 
 
We present the compensation components’ descriptive statistics in Table 3 for both the 
borrowing firms and the matching firms. We report the mean and median for: Salary, Bonus, 
Restricted Stock, Stock Option, Other Compensation, and their sum in Total Compensation. In 
this Table and henceforth, we refer to the year preceding the bank loan agreement as “Year -1”, 
the year of the loan as: “Year 0”, and the year following the bank loan as: “Year +1” 
Methodology 
To measure the change in compensation, we use two different approaches. In the first 
approach, we measure the percentage change in compensation by dividing the value of the 
change in each compensation component, in a given year, by the value of that same component 
in the preceding year. we apply this approach to “Total Compensation”, “Salary”, and “Other 
Compensation”  since  these  variables  display  non-zero  values  throughout  the  entire  sample 
(except for 2 observations), which makes computing the percentage change from one year to 
another  feasible.  However, the remaining compensation components (“Bonus”, “Restricted 
Stocks”, and “Stock Options”) present zero values throughout the years since they are generally 
not granted every year. To avoid losing observations and any distortion in the analysis, we use a 
second approach in computing the change in these compensation components using portfolio 
deciles constructed as follows. We first compute the average of each compensation variable for 
each firm and its corresponding control firm over the three year span. In other terms, this is the 
Page 10
Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal, Volume 19, Number 2, 2015
average of each firm and its corresponding control firm over the three year period surrounding 
the bank loan. 
 
Table 3 
COMPENSATION VARIABLES DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 Borrowing Firms Matching firms 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Total Compensation: 
Year -1 2,850.3 1,764.7 3,309.8 1,914.8 
Year 0 3,404.1 1,945.9 3,342.0 2,019.6 
Year +1 3,444.3 2,129.6 3,639.9 2,087.6 
Salary: 
Year -1 560.98 524.19 556.30 521.00 
Year 0 608.60 573.81 596.46 565.58 
Year +1 641.39 610.00 619.86 590.82 
Bonus: 
Year -1 606.39 318.78 632.08 369.00 
Year 0 597.35 305.00 570.21 329.33 
Year +1 585.21 269.44 546.10 256.96 
Restricted Stock: 
Year -1 372.73 0.00 267.32 0.00 
Year 0 392.89 0.00 424.56 0.00 
Year +1 514.17 0.00 478.22 0.00 
Stock Options: 
Year -1 1,096.8 416.57 1,546.3 511.46 
Year 0 1,344.9 396.57 1,346.6 486.54 
Year +1 1,168.2 379.98 1,402.1 422.75 
Other compensation: 
Year -1 213.43 35.63 307.75 33.37 
Year 0 460.39 58.51 404.19 45.20 
Year +1 535.29 83.95 593.64 70.06 
 
This Table presents the descriptive statistics for borrowing firms and matching firms’ compensation variables which include: 
total compensation, salary, bonus, restricted stocks, stock options and other compensation. The compensation variables are 
reported for the year of the bank loan (year 0), the year before the bank loan (year -1) and the year after the bank loan (year +1). 
 
Second, we construct ten portfolios (deciles) by ranking these averages from the lowest to 
the highest and assign each firm and its corresponding control firm to the same portfolio decile. 
Then, we compute the average value of each portfolio decile. Finally, we measure the percentage 
change separately for borrowing firms and control firms as a percentage of the corresponding 
portfolio decile average. The significance of the differences in the percentage change in the value 
of compensation components is measured by the paired t-test and the Wilcoxon test. 
Changes in the Structure of CEO Compensation 
For changes in compensation structure, we measure the percentage change in the 
proportions of each compensation component. Specifically, we divide the percentage change in 
the proportion (with regard to total compensation) of each compensation component by the 
proportion of that same component in the preceding year. We run into the zero values for the 
variables: “Bonus”, “Restricted Stocks”, and “Stock Options” as well. Therefore, we construct ten 
portfolio deciles following the same approach described above, and measure the percentage 
change in compensation components’ proportions with regard to the corresponding portfolio 
deciles. 
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RESULTS 
Market reaction to the announcement of a bank loan agreement 
Since Former studies relate bank loan relationship benefits to the positive announcement 
period abnormal returns, we start our empirical analysis with an event study analysis to measure 
the market reaction surrounding the announcement of private loan agreements in our sample. For 
the announcement date, we use the “dealActivedate” variable defined in Dealscan as the date the 
deal was issued. In cases of multiple facilities within the deal, the date will be determined as the 
earliest facility date. Since the announcement period abnormal return is beyond the scope of our 
study, we rely on the deal active date variable provided by Dealscan as a proxy for the deal’s 
public announcement date. Later, we show that there is no abnormal return on this deal active 
date. Accordingly, we speculate that the public announcement is subsequent to the deal active 
date since we find significant market reaction for the event windows following the deal active 
date. This also justifies our inclusion of various announcement period event windows in an 
attempt to capture the market abnormal returns. 
We measure the mean daily abnormal returns (ARs) and the mean cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) for multiple event windows. Panel A of Table 4 provides the ARs and CARs for 
the full sample of borrowing firms. We notice an insignificant market reaction for the deal 
issuance date. However, we report a positive and significant abnormal return for the event 
window (0, +5) with a 1% significance level. There are also further evidence of positive CARs 
for the four days window (0, +3) and the 21 days window (-10, +10) surrounding the event day 
(10% significant level). In panel B of Table 4, we split the full sample into a subsample of bank 
loans issued before the year 2000 and bank loans after 2000. Testing the two subsamples 
announcement returns reveals a slight difference in market reaction. In the second half of our 
sample period, the positive abnormal returns are less significant. The disappearance of 
announcement returns in recent years is consistent with the findings of Fields et al. (2006). Next, 
we examine the effect of loan size on market reaction. Hence, we rank our sample loans by the 
total value of the loan proportional to the firm’s market value of equity. We consider the lower 
half of our total sample as the small loan subsample containing loans with value between 10 to 
27% of the firm’s market value of equity. The upper half of our sample represents large loans with 
loan values higher than 27% of the firm’s market value of equity. Then, we test for the 
announcement returns separately on both subsamples (Panel C of Table 4). We report 
statistically insignificant announcement returns for large loans. However, for the subsample of 
small bank loans, we find highly significant abnormal returns specifically for the (0, +5) event 
window. Consequently, we draw the conclusion that capital markets are less optimistic to the 
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Table 4  
TEST OF MARKET REACTION TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A BANK LOAN AGREEMENT 
USING THE FULL SAMPLE OF BORROWING FIRMS 




Full Sample (N = 716)  
Mean (%) Z-statistic %Positive 
AR -1 0.16 0.237 48.74 
AR 0 0.06 0.885 46.65 
AR +1 0.03 0.312 48.88 
CAR -10, -1 0.08 0.985 50.14 
CAR -1, 0 0.21 0.013 48.32 
CAR -1, +1 0.25 1.209 50.56 
CAR 0, +3 0.06 1.957† 51.56† 
CAR 0, +5 0.28 2.630** 53.21** 
CAR -10, +10 0.30 1.733† 51.54† 
Panel  B:  Mean  daily  abnormal returns  and  cumulative  abnormal returns  for  the  full  sample  of 
borrowing firms before year 2000 and after year 2000. 
Intervals of 
trading days(a) 
Before 2000 (N = 302) After 2000 (N = 414) 
Mean (%) Z-statistic %Positive Mean (%) Z-statistic %Positive 
AR -1 0.16 0.274 48.68 0.16 0.078 48.79 
AR 0 0.18 -0.417 46.69 -0.03 -0.808 46.62 
AR +1 -0.14 -0.071 47.68 0.16 0.471 49.76 
CAR -10, -1 0.16 1.887† 53.31† 0.02 -0.316 47.83 
CAR -1, 0 0.33 0.274 48.68 0.13 -0.218 48.07 
CAR -1, +1 0.19 1.081 50.99 0.29 0.668 50.24 
CAR 0, +3 -0.06 0.965 50.66 0.14 1.749† 52.90† 
CAR 0, +5 0.25 2.348* 54.64 0.31 1.454 52.17 
CAR -10, +10 0.36 1.196 51.13 0.25 1.258 51.69 
Panel C: Mean daily abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the sub-sample of Large 
Loans and the sub-sample of Small Loans. 
Intervals of 
trading days(a) 
Large Loans (N = 358) Small Loans (N = 358) 
Mean (%) Z-statistic %Positive Mean (%) Z-statistic %Positive 
AR -1 0.25 -0.908 45.81 0.07 1.243 51.68 
AR 0 0.10 -0.061 48.04 0.01 -1.190 45.25 
AR +1 -0.03 -0.908 45.81 0.10 1.348 51.95 
CAR -10, -1 0.30 1.314 51.68 -0.14 0.079 48.60 
CAR -1, 0 0.35 0.044 48.32 0.08 -0.027 48.32 
CAR -1, +1 0.32 0.362 49.16 0.18 1.348 51.95 
CAR 0, +3 -0.11 0.679 50.00 0.23 2.089* 53.91 
CAR 0, +5 -0.24 0.785 50.28 0.81 2.935** 56.14 
CAR -10, +10 0.52 0.362 49.16 0.07 2.089* 53.91 
 
This Table reports the standard event-study announcement period mean abnormal returns (ARs), cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CARs), Z-statistics for the nonparametric generalized sign test, the percent of sample with positive returns at the 
announcement of private loan agreement. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model estimates from 110 day to 11 
days prior to the event day. The Z-statistics are based on the standardized cross-sectional method (Boehmer et al. 1991).  
2-tailed significance test, with: †, *, ** Significance level at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Bank Borrowers’ Long-Term Performance 
The recent evidence of bank borrowers’ long-term underperformance documented in 
Billett, Flannery and Garfinkell (2006) contradicts the announcement period returns and the 
notion of bank certification as a whole. To the extent that performance is a key determinant of 
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compensation, it is essential to apply some form of long-term performance measurement to our 
sample. While it is evidently beyond the scope of our study, we should note that measuring long- 
term performance has been a contentious subject. Without addressing the complete array of 
measurement techniques, we apply the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) performance 
measure, which is one of the methods of long-term performance used in Billett, Flannery and 
Garfinkell (2006). As explained in Ritter (1991) and Barber and Lyon (1997), we first compute 
the holding period returns (HPR) for each firm in our sample and its corresponding matching 
firm over the three year period following the bank loan announcement. 
We then estimate the mean and median holding period return differences between the 
sample firms and the matching firms. We generally conclude that the borrowing firms 
underperform their peers over the three year period following the bank loan agreement. 
Specifically, the estimate for the mean difference over the three year period is equal to -4.76%. 
This mean difference is significant at the 0.1% level. For the median difference, we find an 
estimate of -3.11% with a 5% significance level. The presence of significant long-term 




BUY-AND-HOLD ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR THE THREE YEARS FOLLOWING LOAN 
ANNOUNCEMENTS 
 Mean Difference Median Difference Number of 
Observations 






This Table presents the Holding-period returns (HPRs) for the three years following the year of the bank loan. We report the 
mean difference and median difference between the sample borrowing firms and their corresponding matching firms. The 
significance t-test is provided between brackets. 
2-tailed significance test, with: *, ** Significance level at the 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Change in Value of Compensation Components 
We expect the CEO to use the bank loan relationship as a bargaining tool to request an 
abnormal increase in compensation or to reduce the performance based compensation. In Table 
6, we report a comparison of the percentage change in compensation between the borrowing 
firms and the matching firms. The results indicate a positive and significant increase in the 
percentage  change  in  compensation  in  the  year  of  the  loan  (significant  at  the  5%  level). 
Similarly, there is a significant (1% level) increase in the year following the bank loan compared 
to the year preceding the loan. For Salary, there is a positive increase in percentage change both 
in the year of the loan and the subsequent year. 
To a lesser extent, this evidence is also supported when comparing the percentage changes 
using portfolio deciles. Nevertheless, there is a much more compelling and consistent evidence of 
a positive increase in the Other Compensation component during the year of the loan (significant 
at the 1% level). In panel B of Table 6, the results indicate a reduction in bonus awards to CEOs 
over the sample period. This reduction is more pronounced for non-borrowing firms when 
compared to borrowing firms. However, this difference is positive and significant at the 0.1% 
level. Within the portfolio deciles analysis, we also notice negative percentage changes in the 
values of stock options. Whereas, the percentage changes in restricted stock is positive and overall 
higher than that of borrowing firms. The differences for both restricted stock and stock options are 
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not significant. 
So far, the evidence suggests that borrowing CEOs benefit from the certification role of 
bank loan agreement through significant increase in compensation. It is however noteworthy to 
find that the increase involves only the compensation components that are least likely to be 
affected by poor performance. Additionally, this result suggests that borrowing CEOs gain a 
greater bargaining power that allows them to negotiate a higher compensation scheme unrelated 
to firm performance. Consequently, the significant increase in compensation justifies, to a certain 
extent, the reason why CEOs tend to tolerate the bank scrutiny, disclosures and covenants. 
The results are consistent with the hypothesis suggesting that borrowing CEOs choose to 
submit themselves to bank scrutiny knowing that they will benefit from the bank relationship. As 
such, CEOs are rewarded by the board through an abnormal increase in salary, bonus, other 
compensation and hence total compensation. The bank certification effect benefits the 
shareholders through the short-term positive market reaction; however, to the CEO this positive 
effect is even more lasting despite the borrowing firm dire long-term performance. 
Changes in the Proportion of Compensation Components 
Subsequently, we examine the change in the proportion of compensation components as a 
percentage of total compensation. Table 7 reports the results using the two approaches: percentage 
change in dollar value (panel A), and percentage change proportional to portfolio deciles (panel 
B). We find that the proportion of salary within the total compensation significantly drops 
using both approaches. For the Other Compensation, the results are mixed. The percentage 
changes are positive in the year of the loan and then negative in the year after. However, there 
is strong evidence of an increase in the proportion of bonus award. Specifically, there is a 
reduction in the proportion of bonus for matching firms that is more pronounced than that of the 
borrowing firms. For the year following the bank loan this change is significant at the 0.1% level 




PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN VALUE OF COMPENSATION COMPONENTS 
Bank loan representing 10% or more of the firm value, sample size = 743. 
Panel A: Percentage change in value 
  Borrowing firms 
 
Matching firms Paired t-test 
Wilcoxon 
test 
 Mean Median Std. dev. Mean Median Std. dev. t-value Z-value 
Total 
Compensation         
Y0   – Y-1 0.5387 0.1014 1.9353 0.3828 0.0539 1.9643 1.53 2.03* 
Y+1 – Y0 0.3767 0.0978 1.4260 0.3422 0.0672 1.3870 0.48 0.89 
Y+1 – Y-1 0.6775 0.2068 2.0954 0.4504 0.1143 1.5917 2.40* 2.77** 
Salary 
Y0   – Y-1 0.1592 0.0526 0.9050 0.0877 0.0588 0.1617 2.12* 0.25 
Y+1 – Y0 0.0583 0.0460 0.1631 0.0450 0.0452 0.1821 1.48 -0.24 
Y+1 – Y-1 0.2271 0.1129 0.9675 0.1435 0.1138 0.2971 2.22* 0.69 
Other 
Compensation         
Y0   – Y-1 10.553 0.0886 67.497 2.7593 0.0561 11.617 3.05** 2.33* 
Y+1 – Y0 15.770 0.0552 210.57 2.6369 0.0439 15.187 1.66† 0.17 
Y+1 – Y-1 30.054 0.2790 291.29 25.653 0.2093 430.99 0.22 1.57 
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Panel B: Percentage change in value using portfolio deciles analysis 
  Borrowing firms 
 
Matching firms Paired t-test 
Wilcoxon 
test 




        
Y0   – Y-1 0.0979 0.0618 0.8493 0.0258 0.0269 0.08805 1.60 1.36 
Y+1 – Y0 0.0625 0.0635 0.8193 0.0647 0.0502 0.8452 -0.05 0.22 
Y+1 – Y-1 0.1604 0.1277 0.8131 0.0905 0.0830 0.9826 1.52 1.92† 
Salary Decile 
Y0   – Y-1 0.0826 0.0502 0.1592 0.0688 0.0527 0.1176 1.98* -0.04 
Y+1 – Y0 0.0517 0.0462 0.1522 0.0389 0.0472 0.2015 1.37 0.41 




        
Y0   – Y-1 0.3363 0.0306 1.3315 0.1482 0.0099 1.0806 3.04** 2.43* 
Y+1 – Y0 0.2374 0.0149 1.6829 0.3731 0.0129 1.5588 1.65† -0.68 
Y+1 – Y-1 0.5737 0.1370 1.6264 0.5213 0.0668 1.6852 0.61 1.43 
Bonus Decile 
Y0   – Y-1 -0.0882 0.0411 1.4889 -0.3158 0.0000 1.3118 3.44*** 4.69*** 
Y+1 – Y0 -0.0615 0.0000 1.2553 -0.1040 0.0000 0.9915 0.75 1.95† 
Y+1 – Y-1 -0.1497 0.0000 1.5853 -0.4198 -0.0484 1.4383 3.95*** 4.44*** 
Restricted    Stock 
Decile         
Y0   – Y-1 0.0565 0.0000 2.4256 0.0250 0.0000 1.9987 0.27 1.29 
Y+1 – Y0 0.0685 0.0000 2.6352 0.2233 0.0000 2.1394 -1.25 -1.43 
Y+1 – Y-1 0.1250 0.0000 2.6095 0.2483 0.0000 2.1952 -1.00 -0.83 
Stock Options 
Decile         
Y0   – Y-1 0.1267 0.0000 1.8965 -0.0345 0.0000 1.9257 0.48 -0.26 
Y+1 – Y0 -0.0659 0.0000 1.7333 -0.0454 0.0000 1.6217 -0.24 -0.25 
Y+1 – Y-1 -0.0532 0.0000 1.7411 -0.0799 0.0000 2.0264 0.28 -0.07 
 
This Table presents the annual percentage change in the value of each of the compensation components. We use (Y0   – Y-1) to 
indicate the difference between the year of the loan and the preceding year, (Y+1 – Y0) to indicate the difference between the year 
following the loan and the year of the loan, and (Y+1 – Y-1) to indicate the difference between the year following the loan and the 
year preceding the loan. There are two different methods used in computing the percentage change. In Panel A, the percentage 
change is computed by dividing the value of the change in each component, in a given year, by the value of that same component 
in the preceding year. The compensation components: total compensation, salary, and other compensation have non-zero values 
throughout the entire sample (except for less than 2 observations), which makes computing the percentage change from one year 
to another feasible. In Panel B, we however use a different method in computing the percentage change since the data for the 
compensation components (bonus, restricted stock, and stock options) presented zero values. The later forms of compensation are 
generally not granted every year. To avoid losing observations and any distortion in the analysis due to dramatic changes in 
percentages (increase from a zero, decrease to a zero), we compute the change in these compensation components using portfolio 
deciles constructed as follows. These deciles are computed separately for bonus, restricted stock and stock options. We first 
compute the average value of each component for each firm and its corresponding control firm over the three year spam. In other 
terms, this is the average of each firm and its control firm over the three year period surrounding the bank loan. Second, we 
construct ten portfolios (deciles) by ranking these averages from lowest to highest. We assign each firm and its corresponding 
control firm to the same portfolio decile. Then, we compute the average value for each decile. Finally, we measure the percen tage 
changes separately for borrowing firms and control firms as a percentage of the corresponding decile average. Essentially, the 
percentage changes in each compensation component are computed proportional to the corresponding deciles. For the sake of 
consistency and comparability, Panel B portfolio deciles analysis also includes the compensation components used in Panel A. 
The difference in the percentage change in the value of compensation components are measured by the paired t-test and the 
Wilcoxon test. The Wilcoxon test is a two-sample test with a normal approximation and two-sided test (Z-value). The paired t- 
test assumes that the differences between pairs are normally distributed. If this assumption is violated, the Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test would be a better alternative. 




Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal, Volume 19, Number 2, 2015
In addition, we notice a significant decrease in the proportion of restricted Stock for the 
year of the loan and the year after (significant at the 5% level for both years). This is an evidence 
of a shift toward a smaller proportion of pay-at-risk. Unlike restricted stock, we find that the 
difference between the borrowing and matching firm changes in stock options are consistently 
insignificant. So far, the evidence indicates that the shift in the proportion of total compensation 
is mainly dominated by an increase in the proportion of bonus award. In addition, there is a less 
compelling evidence for a reduction in the proportion of pay-at-risk compensation. 
 
Table 7 
CHANGE IN THE COMPENSATION COMPONENTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL COMPENSATION 
Bank loan representing 10% or more of the firm value, sample size = 743. 
Panel A: Change in percentage of total compensation 
 Borrowing firms 
 
Matching firms Paired t-test 
Wilcoxon 
test 
 Mean Median Std. dev. Mean Median Std. dev. t-value Z-value 
Salary 
Y0   – Y-1 0.3858 -0.0287 1.9632 0.4460 0.0050 2.2923 -0.54 -1.84† 
Y+1 – Y0 0.2802 -0.0131 1.6514 0.4058 -0.0176 2.1705 -1.33 0.54 
Y+1 – Y-1 0.3540 -0.0571 2.0192 0.7319 0.0000 5.6638 -1.72† -2.47* 
Other 
Compensation       
Y0   – Y-1 10.419 0.0949 73.819 6.7536 0.0476 64.749 1.01 1.65† 
Y+1 – Y0 12.974 0.0248 188.98 8.3539 0.0127 56.163 0.61 -0.85 
Y+1 – Y-1 26.092 0.1842 247.71 14.949 0.1899 167.58 1.00 0.39 
Panel B: Change in percentage to total compensation using portfolio deciles analysis 
 Borrowing firms 
 
Matching firms Paired t-test 
Wilcoxon 
test 
 Mean Median Std. dev. Mean Median Std. dev. t-value Z-value 
Salary Decile 
Y0   – Y-1 -0.0271 -0.0241 0.7169 0.0288 0.0068 0.5845 -1.64† -1.95† 
Y+1 – Y0 -0.0531 -0.0119 0.6456 0.0081 -0.0144 0.6698 -1.81† -0.84 




      
Y0   – Y-1 0.2476 0.0335 1.3012 0.1191 0.0108 1.0290 2.13* 2.03* 
Y+1 – Y0 0.1770 0.0195 1.5486 0.3197 0.0029 1.4733 -1.84* -0.90 
Y+1 – Y-1 0.4246 0.0709 1.5816 0.4387 0.0611 1.5571 -0.18 0.17 
Bonus Decile 
Y0   – Y-1 -0.1711 0.0000 1.5608 -0.3544 -0.0495 1.3023 2.59** 3.27** 
Y+1 – Y0 -0.1355 0.0000 1.2225 -0.1956 -0.0108 1.0383 1.05 2.34** 
Y+1 – Y-1 -0.3067 -0.0066 1.5531 -0.5500 -0.2361 1.3605 3.54*** 4.29*** 
Restricted  Stock 
Decile       
Y0   – Y-1 -0.0194 0.0000 2.6420 0.0193 0.0000 1.5673 -0.34 -0.26 
Y+1 – Y0 0.0133 0.0000 2.4877 0.3033 0.0000 2.3831 -2.29* -0.95 
Y+1 – Y-1 -0.0061 0.0000 2.6074 0.3226 0.0000 2.5038 -2.49* -1.13 
Stock Options 
Decile       
Y0   – Y-1 -0.0865 0.0000 1.6997 -0.0760 0.0000 1.4379 -0.13 -0.99 
Y+1 – Y0 -0.0907 0.0000 1.3505 -0.0986 0.0000 1.2795 0.12 0.46 
Y+1 – Y-1 -0.1773 0.0000 1.5945 -0.1747 0.0000 1.5116 -0.03 -0.17 
 
This Table presents the annual percentage change of the compensation components as a percentage of total compensation. We 
use (Y0   – Y-1) to indicate the difference between the year of the loan and the preceding year, (Y+1 – Y0) to indicate the difference 
between the year following the loan and the year of the loan, and (Y+1 – Y-1) to indicate the difference between the year following 
the loan and the year preceding the loan. There are two different method used in computing the percentage changes. In panel A: 
Page 17
Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal, Volume 19, Number 2, 2015
the percentage change is computed by dividing the percentage change in the proportion (with regard to total compensation) of 
each  component,  in  a  given  year,  by  the  proportion  of  that  same component in the preceding year. The compensation 
components: salary, and other compensation have non-zero values throughout the entire sample (except for less than 2 
observations), which makes computing the percentage change from one year to another feasible. In Panel B, we however use a 
different method in computing the percentage change since the data for the compensation components (bonus, restricted stock, 
and stock options) presents zero values. The later forms of compensation are generally not granted every year. To avoid losing 
observations and any distortion in the analysis due to dramatic changes in percentages (increase from a zero, decrease to a zero), 
we compute the change in these compensation components using portfolio deciles constructed as follows. These deciles are 
computed separately for bonus, restricted stock and stock options. We first compute the average percentage of each component 
for each firm and its corresponding control firm over the three year spam. In other terms, this is the average of each firm and its 
control firm over the three year period surrounding the bank loan. Second, we construct ten portfolios (deciles) by ranking these 
averages from lowest to highest. We assign each firm and its corresponding control firm to the same portfolio decile. Then, we 
compute the average percentage for each decile. Finally, we measure the percentage changes separately for borrowing firms and 
control firms as a percentage of the corresponding decile average. Essentially, the percentage changes in the compensation 
components proportions are computed proportional to the corresponding deciles. For the sake of consistency and comparability, 
panel B portfolio deciles analysis also includes the compensation components used in panel A. 
The differences in the percentage change in the value of compensation components are measured by the paired t-test and the 
Wilcoxon test. The Wilcoxon test is a two-sample test with a normal approximation and two-sided test (Z-value). The paired t- 
test assumes that the differences between pairs are normally distributed. If this assumption is violated, the Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test would be a better alternative. 
2-tails significance test, with: †, *, **, *** Significance level at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% respectively. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Prior literature extensively establishes the “uniqueness” and the “special” nature of bank 
loans. This study extends this evidence to include a positive effect of bank loan agreement on 
CEO compensation. However, this positive effect seems to be at odds with the long-term firm 
underperformance following bank financing. 
Using an extensive sample of 743 major bank loan agreements from 1993-2007, we find 
a positive and significant increase in the CEO total compensation, salary, bonus and other 
compensation over the two years following the bank loan. However, we do not find evidence of a 
significant  increase  in  performance  based  compensation  such  as  restricted  stock  and  stock 
options. 
This implies that borrowing CEOs benefit from the certification role of the bank loan 
relationship through a significant increase in compensation. It is however noteworthy to mention 
that the increase involves only the compensation components that are least likely to be affected 
by poor performance. Overall, we conclude that borrowing CEOs gain a greater bargaining 
power allowing them to negotiate a higher compensation scheme unrelated to firm performance. 
As such, the significant increase in compensation justifies, to a certain extent, the reason why 
CEOs tend to accept the added scrutiny and disclosure embedded in bank loan provisions. 
Overall, our results provide a better understanding of the managerial incentive alignment and 
suggest several valuable implications to both shareholders and regulators. 
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